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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,' prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, and national
origin. The Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)2 and established a complex system of administrative and judicial
enforcement to provide a federal remedy for the victims of employment dis-
crimination. An individual who alleges a violation of Title VII must follow the
procedural requirements of the Act or lose the possibility of a federal remedy.3
One procedural requirement of Title VII is the filing of a timely charge of
employment discrimination with the EEOC. 4 In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver5
the Supreme Court interpreted the filing requirements of the Act. This Case
Comment will review the procedural filing requirements of Title VII and the
appropriate legislative history. It will then examine the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver and will conclude by presenting a proposal for
legislative change.
II. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE VII
The EEOC was created by Congress to enforce the provisions of Title
VII. 6 Congress has also delineated the procedures that the EEOC must follow
in processing a complaint under the Act.7 A person alleging a violation of Title
VII initiates the procedure by filing a complaint with the EEOC. 8 If a state or
local agency exists that is qualified to deal with the problem, the EEOC is
required by the Act to defer the complaint to that agency for a period of
sixty days or until the agency terminates its proceedings, whichever occurs
earlier.9
After receiving the complaint, or after the required deferral period has
elapsed, the EEOC investigates and determines the validity of the claim.' 0 If
the Commission finds probable cause to believe a violation of Title VII has
occurred, it will attempt to remedy the situation through conference, concilia-
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
2. Id., §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5(e) (1976).
3. The procedural requirements of Title VII are set out in text accompanying notes 6-22 injra.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
5. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5(a) (1976).
7. Id., § 2000e-5 (1976).
8. Id., § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
9. Id., § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
10. Id., § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
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tion, or persuasion."If the complaint is not resolved through these methods
or if the Commission does not find probable cause to believe a violation of
Title VII has occurred, the complainant will be issued a "right to sue"
letter. 12This letter authorizes the filing of a private action in federal district
court within ninety days of the receipt of the letter. 3 "This unique combina-
tion of administrative and judicial action in dealing with employment discrimi-
nation claims has caused a good deal of procedural confusion. An example of
this confusion is found in the vague filing requirements of Title VII." "4
The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is a procedural prerequisite
to any federal court action under Title VII.' 5 The filing requirements are
contained in section 706(c) 6 and section 706(e) 17 of the Act. Section 706(c)
currently provides in part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State ... which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice ... no charge may be filed [with the EEOC] by
the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under State or local law unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one
hundred and twenty days under the first year after the effective date of such State
or local law. '
8
The language of section 706(c) must be read in conjunction with the language
contained in section 706(e) that currently provides in part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that in the case of
an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has
initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice .. . such charge shall be filed... within three
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within
thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the
proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier. 1
9
Thus, under the statute if a complainant lives in a state that has no state or
local agency qualified to deal with the problem, the charge must be filed with
the EEOC within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful em-
20ployment practice.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
13. Id.
14. Comment, Title Vl-Tinely Filing Requirement in Deferral States Is Satisfied When the Initial Com-
plaint Is Received by the EEOC Within the 300 Day Limitation of § 706(e), 55 NOTRE DAM E LAW. 396, 393
(1980).
15. Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Education, 8 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 5
(1969-1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
17. Id. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
18. Id. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
19. Id. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
20. Id.
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However, if the complainant lives in a so-called "deferral state," in
which there is a state or local agency equipped to handle the matter, the
charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. 21 Furthermore, in such deferral
states, no charge may be filed with the EEOC until after the expiration of the
mandatory deferral period. 22
Thus, the time limits for filing a charge with the EEOC are not the same
for every individual. This complicated filing system seems out of place in the
context of a statute that attempts to guarantee equality of opportunity to all
workers. The legislative history of Title VII shows why Congress adopted
these inconsistent filing requirements.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE PROCEDURAL FILING REQUIREMENTS OF
TITLE VII
In 1963, President Kennedy sent legislation to Congress that became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of that Act was the first attempt by the
federal government to provide comprehensive guaranties of equal employ-
ment opportunity at the national level. 23 "Its passage, over a well-organized
and powerful opposition, was accomplished after what has been termed 'an
epic legislative struggle' and the legislative product that emerged provides a
classic example of congressional compromise."
' 24
Title VII has been decried as less than a model of legal draftsmanship.
"Nowhere is this indictment more deserved than in the sections dealing with
the procedures preliminary to court enforcement .... [T]he law's procedural
aspects are often paramount to the substantive provisions to which they are
the threshold." ''
The drafters of Title VII envisioned a system of dual enforcement with
both state and federal governments cooperating to eliminate employment
discrimination. While the EEOC was created to oversee federal enforcement
of the Act, the integrity of state and local Fair Employment Practice (FEP)
agencies was preserved by the specific provision for concurrent jurisdiction
when the claim arose in a state that had such an FEP agency.26
The core of the dual enforcement scheme is a deferral system that requires the
EEOC to refer complaints of employment discrimination to a fair employment
21. Id.
22. Id. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
23. See Comment, A Look At Love v. Pullman Co., 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (1%9).
24. Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Education, 8 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 1
(1969-1970). See generally Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1%9); B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION LAW 860 (1976); Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B. C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
25. Coleman, Title VII oJ the Civil Rights Act: Four Years oJ Procedural Education, 8 DUQ. L. REV. 1,2-3
(1969-1970).
26. At the time the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, 25 states had FEP laws. By regulation, the EEOC
has designated certain FEP agencies as "designated 706 agencies" for purposes of the mandatory deferral
requirements contained in § 706(c) of Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) (1979).
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practices agency in the state in which the complaint arose, and refrain from taking
action until the state has been given an opportunity to resolve the matter under its
laws. This system was intended to insure state involvement in the enforcement
process, and, at the same time, to lighten the heavy enforcement burden of the
EEOC.27
A. The Legislative History of the 1964 Act
The House of Representatives passed its version of the Comprehensive
Civil Rights Act on February 10, 1964.28 Title VII of the House bill contained
a six-month limitations period for a complainant to file a charge with the
EEOC. The House version, which did not contemplate differing treatment of
complaints based upon the existence of a state FEP agency, met with strong
opposition in the Senate.
The principal opposition focused not on the details of the bill, but on its fundamen-
tal purpose. During the course of one of the longest fillibusters in the history of the
Senate, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate carefully forged the compromise
substitute (Dirksen compromise) that was ultimately to become in substantial part
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29
Section 706(d) of the compromise bill provided that a charge of employ-
ment discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of the
alleged act of discrimination,3" one-half the time limitation adopted by the
House. Section 706(b) of the compromise bill introduced the concept of
mandatory deferral, whereby the EEOC must allow a state or local agency, if
one exists, sixty days in which to resolve the problem under the local law.
Section 706(d) extended to 210 days the time within which complainants in
deferral states must file with the EEOC.3 1 In drafting this modification, the
Senators considered that many states and localities already had enacted FEP
laws. 32 "[Section] 706(d)'s longer time of 210 days for filing with the EEOC in
deferral States was included to prevent forfeiture of a complainant's federal
rights while participating in state proceedings."- 33 As finally enacted by
Congress, Title VII contained the procedures called for in the compromise.
B. Interpretation of the 1964 Act
The EEOC issued procedural regulations that interpreted the filing
requirements contained in subsections (b) and (d) of the 1964 Act. 4 The
27. Shawe, Employment Discrimination-The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the De-
ferral Quagmire, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 221, 222 (1976). See generally Bukes, Administrative Prerequisites to
Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Recent Developments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 655
(1978-1979); Comment, A Look at Love v. Pullman Co., 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 182 (1969); 110 CONG. REC.
12,724-25 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
28. See 110 CONG. REC. 2511-12 (1964).
29. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819-820 (1980).
30. 110 CONG. REC. 12,593-94 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
31. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820 (1980).
32. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,721-25 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 8192-95 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Dirksen).
33. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 821 (1980).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1968).
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Commission determined that if a state did not have a state or local agency that
was empowered to handle a discrimination claim, the EEOC would consider
the charge to be filed upon receipt of the complaint by the federal agency. If a
claim arose in a deferral state and the charge was received by the EEOC
before the complainant had filed with the appropriate state or local agency,
the EEOC would refer the charge to the appropriate agency and consider the
charge to be filed upon the expiration of the mandatory deferral period. 35 By
this regulation, the EEOC sought to protect the rights of complainants and to
comply with the statutory language that no charge could be filed with the
EEOC during the deferral period. The EEOC also sought to comply with the
congressional objective of allowing the states to have an initial period of
exclusive jurisdiction over such complaints.
The validity of this procedural regulation was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Love v. Pullman Co.36 In Love the complainant sent a letter to the
EEOC alleging that his employer had discharged him because of his race.
Because the claim arose in Colorado, a deferral state, the EEOC referred the
charge to the appropriate state agency pursuant to EEOC regulations. The
state agency notified the EEOC that no action would be taken on the charge.
The EEOC considered the charge to be filed with the Commission on receipt
of this notice because such notice ended the mandatory deferral period. After
investigation, the EEOC found probable cause to believe a violation of Title
VII had occurred.37 Love filed his action upon receipt of a right to sue letter.
The Pullman Company moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
Love had not filed a timely charge with the EEOC after the state agency
refused to take action on the charge.38
The Supreme Court interpreted the language of subsections (b) and (d) of
the 1964 Act to allow the EEOC, rather than the complainant, to initiate
proceedings with the appropriate state or local agency.39 When a charge of
employment discrimination arose in a deferral state and was filed initially with
the EEOC, the EEOC could refer the charge to the proper state or local
agency and hold the complaint "in 'suspended animation,' automatically
filing it upon termination of the state proceedings." 4' The complainant was
not required to file a second charge with the EEOC after the deferral period.4'
The Court declared that use of this "procedure [by the EEOC] complies with
the purpose both of § 706(b), to give state agencies a prior opportunity to
consider discrimination complaints, and of § 706(d), to ensure expedition in
the filing and handling of those complaints." 42 Congress relied on this case
during the debates preceding the 1972 amendments to Title VII.43
35. Id.
36. 404 U.S. 522 (1971).
37. Id. at 524.
38. Id.




43. See text accompanying notes 45-59 inJra.
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C. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII
Title VII was amended in 1972. "[The] amendments, while increasing the
length of certain time periods, left the essential procedural structure of the
1964 Act relatively unchanged." 44 Like the 1964 Act, the amendments were
the result of a compromise worked out in conference committee.
Section 706(d) of the 1964 Act became section 706(e) and the time period
for filing an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC was lengthen-
ed. Both the House bill and the Senate bill required charges to be filed with
the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination, 45 double the
time period allowed under the 1964 Act. The Senate bill allowed an additional
120 days to file with the EEOC if a charge was deferred to a state agency,
while the House Bill allowed only thirty additional days.46 The Senate's version
was adopted by the conference committee.
Section 706(b) of the 1964 Act became section 706(c) and was left bas-
ically unchanged. The Senate proposed an amendment to remove any refer-
ence to filing in section 706(c) and to substitute language stating that the
EEOC could take no action on a charge until after the expiration of the
deferral period.47 This amendment was patterned after the EEOC procedural
regulations and would have clarified the statute.48 The Senate Report
asserted:
The present statute is somewhat ambiguous respecting Commission action on
charges filed prior to resort to the State or local agency. The new language clarifies
the present statute by permitting the charge to be filed but prohibiting the
Commission from taking action with respect thereto until the deferral period has
elapsed.49
The House bill, adopted by the conference committee, made no change in the
wording of the statute. The reason the Senate amendment was not adopted
was articulated in the conference committee report: "The conferees left exist-
ing law intact with the understanding that the decision in Love v. Pullman Co.
• . . interpreting the existing law to allow the Commission to receive a charge
(but not act on it) during such deferral period is controlling." 50 An analysis of
the conference committee report discussed section 706(c) of the Act, restated
the conferee's language cited above, and added, "Similarly, the recent circuit
court decision of Vigil v. AT & T ... is within the intent of this Act."',
In Vigil,5 the plaintiff filed an employment discrimination charge with
44. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 861 (1976).
45. S. CONF. REP. NO. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972), H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2181.
46. See sources cited in note 45 supra.
47. 118 CONG. REC. 290 (1972).
48. See discussion of the EEOC regulations in text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
49. S. REP. NO. 412, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1971).
50. S. CONF. REP. NO. 681, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 17 (1972), H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 899, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2181.
51. 118 CONG. REC. 7167 (1972) (Senate); 118 CONG. REC. 7564 (1972) (House of Representatives).
52. Vigil v. AT & T, 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972).
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the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Eighteen days later, Vigil sent a
similar charge to the EEOC. The EEOC treated the charge as if it had been filed
sixty days after the date Vigil filed his initial claim with the state agency
because that date was the expiration of the mandatory deferral period.5 ' The
EEOC processed the charge and found probable cause to believe a violation
of Title VII had occurred. A right to sue letter was issued and Vigil filed suit.'
AT & T argued that Vigil's filing with the EEOC was not timely because,
according to the plain language of the statute, a charge could not be filed with
the EEOC during the deferral period.5 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that allowing a party to file with the EEOC during the deferral period was
within the intent of the Act, although the EEOC could take no action on the
charge until after the expiration of the deferral period. 6 The court considered
its decision mandated by Love v. Pullman Co.
5 7
The legislative history, therefore, indicates that Congress believed the
Love decision made the proposed Senate amendment totally unnecessary.
The conference committee relied on Love for the proposition that a charge
could be filed with the EEOC during the deferral period.58 However, Love
does not so hold. In discussing the EEOC's regulation that allows a charge to
be filed upon receipt, the Court in Love stated: "[T]he statutory prohibition of
§ 706(b) [now § 706(c)] against filing charges [with the EEOC] that have not
been referred to a state or local authority necessarily creates an exception to
the regulation of filing on receipt." 59 Thus, the Court in Love actually indicat-
ed that a charge could not be filed with the EEOC during the mandatory
deferral period.
This congressional misinterpretation of the Love decision became a
major issue in the case of Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,60 in which the Supreme
Court once again interpreted the filing requirements of Title VII.
IV. MOHlASCO CORP. V. SILVER
A. Background
On August 29, 1975, Ralph Silver, an economist, was discharged by the
Mohasco Corporation. Two hundred and ninety-one days later, the EEOC
received a letter from Silver alleging that his discharge had been motivated by
religious discrimination. The EEOC, following the procedural requirements of
Title VII, promptly referred Silver's charge to the New York State Division of
Human Rights.6'
53. Id. at 1223
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1224.
56. Id; see discussion at note 83 infra.
57. Vigil v. AT & T, 455 F.2d 1222, 1224(1972); see discussion of Love v. Pullman Co. in text accompany-
ing notes 36-42 supra.
58. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 832 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also discussion of the
conference committee report in text accompanying note 50 supra.
59. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 n.5 (1971).
60. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
61. Id. at 810.
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The EEOC advised the state agency that pursuant to its procedural reg-
ulations, the charge would be filed automatically with the EEOC at the end of
the sixty days deferral period or on the 300th day after the alleged act of
discrimination.62
The EEOC began formal processing of Silver's charge on August 20,
1976, almost one year after his discharge. 6 On February 9, 1977, the state
agency issued a determination that there was no probable cause to believe
that Mohasco had discriminated against Silver.64 On August 24, 1977, the
EEOC adopted the findings of the state agency and issued a right to sue letter,
which allowed Silver to pursue his claim in federal district court. Silver filed
his action on November 23, 1977, in the Northern District of New York.
Mohasco responded by moving for summary judgment, arguing that Silver's
claim was time-barred under Title VII because it was not filed with the EEOC
within 300 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment prac-
61tice.
The Supreme Court defined the issue as whether "Congress intended the
word 'filed' to have the same meaning in subsections (c) and (e) of § 706." 6
According to subsection (c), no charge may be filed with the EEOC until the
state or local agency has had sixty days to consider the matter; according to
subsection (e), a charge must befiled with the EEOC in a deferral state within
300 days of the alleged act. If the EEOC could consider the charge to be filed
on the day it was received, Silver's charge would have been timely. If the
EEOC could not consider the charge to be filed until after the mandatory
deferral period, Silver's charge would not have been timely because the 60-
day deferral period did not end until 351 days after the alleged act of dis-
crimination.
B. Action in the Lower Courts
The district court67 granted Mohasco's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that Silver's failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 68 The district court read subsections
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(I)(v)(A) (1977). The regulation then in effect stated:
In cases where the document is submitted to the Commission more than 180 days from the date of the
alleged violation .... the case shall be deferred pursuant to the procedures set forth above: Provided,
however, That unless the Commission is earlier notified of the termination of the State or local
proceedings, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed with the Commission on the 300th day
following the alleged discrimination and will commence processing the case.
Id. (emphasis in original). The current regulation is at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1979).
63. Comment, Title VII-Timnely Filing Requirement in Deferral States Is Satisfied When the Initial Com-
plaint Is Received by the EEOC Within the 300 Day Limitation of § 706(e), 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396, 397
(1980).
64. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 810 n.5 (1980).
65. Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1086 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
66. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 809 (1980).
67. Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 497 F. Supp. I (N.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
447 U.S. 807 (1980).
68. Id. at 13.
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(c) and (e) literally and held that Silver's charge could not be filed with the
EEOC under section 706(c) until sixty days after the charge had been filed
with the state agency. "Because that date was 51 days beyond § 706(e)'s
300-day time limit for filing [with the EEOC] in so-called 'deferral states,' the
charge was not timely filed." 69
The court decided that the word "filed" has the same meaning in both
subsections (c) and (e) of the Act. When in subsection (c) the statute says "no
charge may be filed," it means literally that no charge can be filed with the
EEOC during the deferral period. Since subsection (e) requires that a charge
must be filed within 300 days after the alleged act, it was not possible for
Silver to file a timely charge with the EEOC. The district court refused to
apply the EEOC regulation that would have considered the charge to be
timely,7" because it considered the regulation "contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court72 and
held that "[t]he requirement in § 706(c) that no charge may be 'filed' before
the deferral period ends simply means the EEOC may not process a Title VII
complaint until sixty days after it has been referred to a state agency." 73 The
court concluded that a literal reading of the statute did not give sufficient
weight to the overriding purpose of the Act and was not faithful to the "strong
federal policy in ensuring that employment discrimination is redressed." 74
The court stated, "[W]e have resisted any temptation to require technical
precision of Title VII plaintiffs, who often proceed without counsel." 75
According to the appellate court, the district court decision required a Title
VII complainant to file his charge with the EEOC within 240 days after the
discriminatory act or lose the possibility of any federal remedy.76 The
problem with such a requirement is that a layman who reads the statute may
not understand the 240-day limitation because the number 240 does not
appear anywhere in the Act.77
Therefore, the appeals court held, in a deferral state a charge must be
received by the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination
per section 706(e). After receipt by the EEOC, according to section 706(c),
the charge must be referred to the proper state or local agency and the EEOC
can take no action on the charge until the deferral period expires.78 This
interpretation is in harmony with the overall procedural scheme of Title VII
69. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 812 (1980).
70. Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1977), in note 62 supra.
71. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 813 (1980).
72. Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
73. Id. at 1088.
74. Id. at 1087.
75. Id. Silver filed his own complaint in the District Court. 447 U.S. 807, 811 n. 10 (1980). However, at the
trial and on appeal, he was represented by counsel.
76. 602 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1088.
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that allows state agencies an opportunity to resolve disputes between em-
ployers and employees before intervention by the federal agency. 79 The court
thus concluded that since Silver's charge was received by the EEOC before
the 300 day limit of section 706(e) had expired, his charge was timely filed
under Title VII. 80
C. Decision of the Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court"' noted that a con-
flict existed among various courts of appeals on the issue involved in Silver. 92
The decision of the Second Circuit in Silver was consistent with the holding of
the Tenth Circuit in Vigil v. AT & T83 but conflicted with the decision of the
Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp.,84 a case decided under the 1964
Act. In Moore, the court held that an employment discrimination charge
could not be filed with the EEOC during the deferral period. 85 According to
the court, its interpretation of the filing requirements met the "stated
'purpose both of § 706(b) [now § 706(c)], to give the state agencies a prior
opportunity to consider discrimination complaints, and of § 706(d) [now
§ 706(e)], to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those com-
plaints.' ,86
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Olson v. Rembrandt
Printing Co. 87 also conflicted with the decision of the Second Circuit in
Silver. The Eight Circuit held in Olson that to preserve the federal rights
guaranteed by Title VII, a complainant must always file his initial charge with
either the EEOC or a deferral agency within 180 days as required by the first
sentence of section 706(e). If the charge is filed initially with the appropriate
agency in a deferral state, the complainant has the benefit of the extension
contained in section 706(e) that allows 300 days in which to file the charge
with the EEOC. 8
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Silver by adopting the Moore
rationale 89 and concluding that Silver had not filed a timely charge with the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
82. Id. at 814-15.
83. 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972). See discussion of Vigil in text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
84. 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
85. Id. at 824.
86. Id. (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1971)).
87. 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).
88. See discussion of Olson in text accompanying notes 124-30 infra.
89. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814-15 n. 16 (1980). The Moore decision was written by Justice
Stevens while he was ajudge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 559 F.2d 811
(7th Cir. 1972). The court in Moore held that no charge could be filed with the EEOC during the deferral period.
Id. at 824. See discussion of Moore at notes 84-86 supra. In Moore, the court was interpreting the filing
requirements of the 1964 Act because the case arose prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments to Title
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EEOC.90 The Court decided that the plain language of the statute dictated that
charges arising in a deferral state must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days
after the alleged discrimination in order to be timely under section 706(e). 9'
The Court read section 706(c) of the Act as prohibiting the filing of a
charge with the EEOC until after the expiration of the mandatory deferral
period. Under this view, Silver's charge could not have been filed with the
EEOC until 351 days after Silver's discharge. 9- Because Silver did not file a
timely charge with the EEOC, he lost his right to a federal remedy under Title
VII.
The Court examined the legislative history of the filing requirements,
to ensure that a literal interpretation of the Act would "effectuate Congress'
purpose underlying Title VII." 93 The Court recognized that the purpose of
mandatory deferral is "to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the
evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal inter-
vention unless its need [is] demonstrated." 94
In discussing the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the Court noted that the
Senate had proposed an amendment to section 706(c) that, if adopted, would
have allowed Silver's charge to be considered as timely filed. 95 The Court
concluded that "[tlo the extent that Congress focused on the issue at all in
1972, it expressly rejected the language that would have mandated the exact
result that respondent urges." 96 Discussing the conference committee report
that stated that "conferees left existing law intact with the understanding that
the decision in Love v. Pullman ... is controlling," '  the Court correctly
noted that a "literal reading of the word 'filed' in section 706 is fully supported
by the Love opinion."9g Therefore, according to the majority, the legislative
history supported a literal reading of the Act.99 The Court determined that,
consistent with the intent of Congress, a charge could not be filed with the
EEOC during the deferral period. io Under this interpretation, Silver had not
filed a timely charge with the EEOC and therefore could not pursue a remedy
in federal court.
VII. The court in Moore stated that the legislative history of the 1972 re-enactment was not relevant to a proper
interpretation of Title VII's filing requirements as they were enacted in 1964. 559 F.2d 811, 830 (7th Cir. 1972).
Justice Stevens is also the author of the majority opinion in Silver, which adopts the Moore decision. Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814 n. 16 (1980). Although the legislative history of the 1972 amendments is
discussed in Silver, Justice Stevens continues to ignore its relevance. See discussion of the legislative history in
the majority opinion in text accompanying notes 95-100 infra.
90. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see full discussion of the legislative history in text accompanying notes 23-60 supra.
94. 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980).
95. Id. at 822-23. See discussion of the proposed amendment in text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
96. Id. at 824.
97. Id. at 823.
98. Id.; see discussion of Love at note 59 supra. The Moore decision, which the Court adopted in Silver,
relied heavily on the decision in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1971).
99. 447 U.S. 807, 822 (1980).
100. Id.
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2. The Dissent 'o
The dissenters "believe[d] that the Court's decision neither [was] correct
as a matter of statutory construction, nor [did] it dispel the existing decisional
conflict ... in an acceptable fashion." 102 In their view, Congress intended to
adopt an alternative interpretation of the interplay between subsections (c)
and (e). 03 The dissent pointed out that the EEOC "has always treated as
timely a charge filed within the 300-day period specified in § 706(e), without
regard to the 60-day deferral period specified in § 706(c)." 104 In their view this
agency interpretation had received congressional approval when Congress
reenacted the predecessors to subsections (c) and (e) in 1972. '05 The dissent
also placed great weight on the conference committee report that stated, "No
change ... was deemed necessary in view of the recent Supreme Court
decision of Love v. Pullman Co .... which approved the present EEOC
deferral procedures as fully in compliance with the intent of the Act." 106
Although the dissent indicated that the majority opinion in Silver is
consistent with the Love holding, the dissenters believed the majority
"obviously err[ed] in interpreting the Conference Report itself. The relevant
inquiry is not what this Court actually held in Love, as the Court seems to
think, but what the Conference Committee writing some six weeks after Love,
thought that the Court held." 107 At the time of the 1972 amendments,
Congress believed that existing law "permitted the EEOC to treat as timely
those charges filed in a deferral State within 300 days, without regard to the
'no charge may be filed' language of § 706(c), and intended that that interpre-
tation should continue to be considered 'controlling'." 03 Thus, the dissent
concluded that a fair analysis of the legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to allow a charge to be filed with the EEOC under § 706(e) during the
deferral period. "0 Moreover, as the dissent correctly noted, the Moore deci-
sion, "0 which the majority adopted as the proper interpretation of the statute,
was decided under the 1964 Act and did not consider the effect of the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 amendments."'
The dissenters would have affirmed the decision of the court of appeals
that a charge could be filed with the EEOC during the deferral period although
the EEOC would not be permitted to act on the charge until the expiration of
sixty days or until termination of state proceedings, whichever occurred
101. The dissent was authored by Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
102. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 828-29.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 829.
106. Id. at 831 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7167 (1972)).
107. Id. at 832.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 833.
110. See discussion of Moore in note 89 supra.
Ill. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 829 n. 1(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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earlier." 2 Under this view, Silver's complaint would have been timely filed
with the EEOC.
Because the majority opinion does not reflect the intent of Congress, the
dissent concluded, "It remains for Congress to restrike the balance ... it
plainly intended to set when it reenacted §§ 706(c) and (e) in 1972." 3
V. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
A. The Need for a Change-Problems Created by the Court's Decision
in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in Silver,
the interpretation of subsections (c) and (e) of section 706 by the majority of
the Court does not create "a fixed and settled procedure for filing a Title VII
complaint."" 4 The ability of a complainant to file a timely charge with the
EEOC will vary depending on several factors, and the resulting inconsistency
could lead to many problems.
If the complainant does not live in a deferral state, the charge must be
filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. " 5
However, if the complainant does live in a deferral state, the charge must be
filed, pursuant to the Court's opinion in Silver, soon enough to allow the
sixty day deferral period to expire within 300 days.
In other words, section 706(c) requires the expiration of the deferral
period before a charge may be filed with the EEOC in a deferral state. The
deferral period expires after (1) 60 days if the deferral agency is more than one
year old; (2) 120 days if the deferral agency is less than one year old; or (3)
termination of the deferral agency's proceedings, which may occur before the
60 or 120 days have elapsed." 6 According to Silver, a claim arising in a
deferral state will be timely if it is received by the EEOC on a date that allows
the deferral period to end within 300 days after the alleged unlawful act. The
last day a timely charge could be filed can be determined by the formula: 300
days minus the deferral period equals the last day a timely charge in a deferral
state may be filed. The problem with this formula is that the deferral period
could be any number between 1 and 120.
Generally, a charge in a deferral state will be timely if it is received by the
EEOC within 240 days after the alleged unlawful act. However, a charge filed
with the EEOC after the 240th day may be timely if the deferral agency
completes its action before the 300th day.
In other words, if the hypothetical complainant files his charge 270 days after his
discharge, and the EEOC refers the charge to the relevant state agency immedi-
112. Id. at 828.
113. Id. at 835.
114. Id. at 833.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
116. 42 u.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
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ately, and that agency terminates its proceedings within 30 days, the federal charge
will have been timely filed. But if the state agency does not terminate its proceed-
ings for a year (perhaps due to backlog or, ironically, because the complaint has
merit), then the EEOC cannot consider the charge to have been filed until 330 days
have elapsed, and the complainant will be unable to invoke his federally protected
rights. 7
An employee in this situation must wait to see whether the state takes speedy
action so as to allow him to pursue his federal remedy. "This 'wait and see'
rule seems out of place in the context of a federal statute designed to vindicate
workers' rights to be free from invidious discrimination in the workplace." ,"
This problem is compounded in the states in which the deferral agency is
less than one year old. In such states, the mandatory deferral period is 120
days," 9 and a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days in order to
insure that the deferral period will end prior to the 300 day time limit. If a
complainant filed with the EEOC after 180 days, timely filing would be deter-
mined by the "wait and see" rule.
Title VII is designed to allow workers to file a claim with the EEOC
without the aid of an attorney. A layman who is not trained in statutory
construction may not be able to discover the general 240-day filing rule for
deferral states because in a statute that is full of numbers, the number 240
does not appear. Furthermore, a complainant working in a nondeferral state
has only 180 days in which to file a timely charge with the EEOC. Therefore,
Title VII, an act with the avowed purpose of outlawing discrimination, does
not apply to all workers in the same fashion and thereby discriminates against
workers in nondeferral states by requiring them to act with more diligence
than is required of workers in deferral states.
The dissent in Silver pointed out other problems.
Will complainants in deferral States be permitted to seek artificially speedy termi-
nations of state proceedings in order to preserve their federal rights? Will
employers be permitted to oppose such early terminations of state proceedings?
Will state and local agencies be permitted to adopt a practice of terminating pro-
ceedings immediately whenever a complainant referred to them by the EEOC
needs prompt action in order to preserve his federal remedies? These unanswered
questions lead me to conclude that the Court's "rather straightforward reading" of
§ 706 may indeed lead to "absurd and futile results," despite the Court's conclu-
sion to the contrary.1
20
Congress must provide the answers to these problems. Its purpose in
creating the deferral system was to allow the states to solve their own prob-
lems according to state law.12 ' The stringent time requirements were designed
to protect against "the problem of 'second thought complaints,' stale com-
117. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 834 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
120. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 835 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,721-25 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
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plaints and the hampering effect they can have on our labor market." 122 Any
proposed change in the statute should achieve these goals as well as solve the
problems created by the Silver decision.
B. Proposed Change-The Previous Senate Amendment
The amendment offered by the Senate in 1972 would be one method of
clarifying the statute. That amendment would have changed section 706(c) to
read as follows:
In the case of a charge filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved
alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or political sub-
division of a State which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employ-
ment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with
respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof the Commission shall take no action
with respect to the investigation of such charge before the expiration of sixty days
after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier terminated, except that such sixty-day period shall
be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effec-
tive date of such local law. 123
The amendment would allow the complainant in a deferral state to file a
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination as
provided by section 706(e). The EEOC would then refer the charge to the
state agency and begin processing the charge after sixty days or after the state
agency completed its action, whichever occurred earlier. However, if a com-
plainant lived in a nondeferral state, the charge would have to be filed with
the EEOC within 180 days in order to be timely. Thus, a complainant working
in a deferral state would have a "bonus" of 120 days in which to initiate his
claim with the EEOC.
This scheme would protect the rights of the states by allowing them to act
on a claim before the federal agency could intervene. However, a complainant
could wait 300 days before initially filing a complaint. Thus, the goal of
preventing stale claims would not be furthered. Also, this solution would
allow a worker in a deferral state to act within 300 days after the dis-
criminatory act while allowing a worker in a nondeferral state only 180 days.
Thus, under the proposed amendment all workers would not be treated
equally.
C. Proposed Change-The Olson Approach
The approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in Olson v. Rembrandt Printing
Co. 24 provides a better solution. Olson filed a charge of sex discrimination
with the EEOC on April 3, 1972, more than 180 days after she had been
122. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 421 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1970).
123. 118 CONG. REC. 290 (1972) (emphasis added).
124. 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).
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discharged.' 25 Pursuant to its regulations, the EEOC immediately referred her
charge to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. The state agency
returned the charge to the EEOC for processing due to a backlog of complaints
at the state agency. Upon investigation, the EEOC found probable cause to
believe that a violation of Title VII had occurred. After receiving a right to sue
letter, Olson filed an action in federal court.'
26
The court in Olson held that the charge had not been timely filed under
section 706(e) of the Act, because a charge of discrimination always must be
filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. 27 According to this
view, if the claim arose in a nondeferral state, the complainant would have
180 days in which to file a timely charge with the EEOC under the general
time limitation contained in section 706(e).
If the claim arose in a deferral state, the complainant would have 180
days in which to file a charge with either the EEOC or a state FEP agency. If
the complainant initially filed the charge with a state or local agency, she
would receive the benefit of section 706(e)'s extended time limit of 300 days in
which to file a timely charge with the EEOC. 28 If the complainant originally
filed the charge with the EEOC, the Commission would refer the charge to the
proper deferral agency and consider the charge to be filed onthe expiration of
the deferral period. 29 In either case, a claim that arose in a deferral state
would have to be filed within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination in
order to be timely under section 706(e). The legislative history of the Act
shows that at least one congressman believed the holding in Olson to be the
correct interpretation of the statute.
30
Under the Olson view, the state agency always would have the first
opportunity to act on a discrimination charge. And the procedure would pro-
tect against the filing of stale claims by requiring all charges to be brought
within 180 days of the discriminatory act, thereby effectuating the goals of
Congress. 3 ' Moreover, a person working in a deferral state must act in the
same timely manner as a person in a nondeferral state. 132 Thus, all workers
would be treated equally under the statute.
125. Id. at 1231.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1233.
128. Id.
129. This was the holding of the Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman Co., discussed in text accompanying
notes 36-42, and at note 59 supra.
130. 118 CONG. REC. 7569 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dent).
13 1. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
132. The court in Olson stated:
It would not be in keeping with the intent of Congress to allow one individual 300 days to file a charge
because of the fortuitous circumstance that the state where the claim arose is a deferral state .... The
purpose underlying the extended period in a deferral state is to give the state agency an initial oppor-
tunity to process the claim without jeopardizing the federal right, not to extend by 120 days the time for
assertion of this federal right.
Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Under this approach, it would not matter whether the state agency were
either more or less than one year old, because the deferral period would end,
in either case, before the 300-day limitation period of section 706(e) had
passed. Therefore, the Olson approach solves all of the problems inherent in
the Silver solution and, at the same time, effectuates the goals of Congress.
In order to achieve the Olson approach, Congress should amend section
706(e) of Title VII to read as follows:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of
the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged un-
lawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom
such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in the case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved
has, within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice occurred, instituted proceedings with a State or local agency
with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within
three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice oc-
curred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local
agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, which-
ever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission
with the State or local agency.
The addition of the italicized phrase would clarify the ambiguities that are
inherent in the current version of the filing requirements of the Act. This
amendment would make it clear to future complainants that they have only
180 days in which to file a charge of employment discrimination or lose their
federal rights and remedies. The amendment would also have the effect of
treating workers in deferral states exactly the same as workers in nondeferral
states; each would have 180 days to file an initial complaint. The amendment
would protect against stale claims and at the same time allow the states to
have the first opportunity to act on the charge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must take action so that the Title VII filing requirements will
effectuate the congressional goal of providing equal employment opportunity
to all workers. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver the Supreme Court interpreted the
filing requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, in
a manner contrary to the legislative history of the Act, thus compounding the
problem it sought to solve. Congress should amend section 706(e) of Title
VII to clarify the filing requirements of the Act and create a fair and settled
procedure for the filing of a Title VII complaint.
Marlene P. Frank
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